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Abstract In ten member states of the European Union (EU) the new con-
stitutional treaty was supposed to be ratified by referendum. A growing
number of theoretical models predicts that such additional ratification hurdles
result in an advantage for negotiators in the bargaining game. The impact
such a referendum constraint can exert, however, depends on the timing of
its announcement, the remaining ratification rules as well as the preference
constellations. If parliament and voters are actually in favor of the new treaty,
ratification constraints may cease to affect the bargaining outcome. After
presenting the theoretical foundation of these arguments, we present empirical
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evidence much in line with the theoretical implications. More specifically,
especially for the issues changed during the intergovernmental conference,
those governments gained that had scheduled a referendum and voters had
a stronger preference for the status quo.
Keywords Negotiations · Referendums · Two-level games
JEL Codes K33 · H77 · D72
1 Introduction
The negative outcomes of the referendums in France and the Netherlands,
followed by the decided suspension of the referendums in Great Britain and
the anticipated suspension in Denmark,1 has at least temporarily halted the
ratification of the “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.”2 These
events, combined with the unprecedented number of referendums scheduled
on this treaty, illustrate the increasing importance of popular input in ratifica-
tion processes of international treaties, at least in the European Union (EU).
The negative outcomes of the referendums in France and the Netherlands also
provide ample illustration of so-called “involuntary defections” (e.g., Schelling
1960; Iida 1996) in the ratification of international treaties.
While these topical events raise the question of what will happen to the
EU-constitution, and how the two countries having experienced a negative
referendum outcome will deal with their rejection, our focus will be on how
expectations of such possible ratification accidents may have affected the
negotiations on the EU constitution. Ratification accidents may obviously
happen in different arenas, but given the considerable number of referendums
having been scheduled on the EU-constitution, the focus of this article will be
on the impact of popular consultations. Needless to say, assessing the impact
of these referendums requires controlling for the possible impact of the other
ratification hurdles.3
The argument that the hurdles raised by the domestic ratification proce-
dures may affect the bargaining outcome is prominent in the literature on
two-level games (e.g., Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988; Iida 1993; Schneider and
Cederman 1994; Mo 1994; Milner and Rosendorff 1996). Empirical studies
1The British government has suspended the discussion of the bill that would have led to a
referendum (Financial Times, June 7, 2005, 1), while the Danish government is still hesitating
(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 11, 2005, 3). At the time of writing 15 member countries have ratified
the EU constitution (Source: http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm (accessed June
24, 2006), while the member states have decided to keep on hold the treaty for another year
(Financial Times June 16, 2006, 3).
2This is the official name of what we will refer to as EU-constitution in what follows.
3In previous work (Hug and Schulz 2005), we did not control for these other hurdles. In addition,
in this article we also address more specifically the problem whether particular gains might be due
more to “luck” than “power” (Barry 1980a,b).
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(e.g., Evans et al. 1993; Milner 1997; König and Hug 2000; Hug and König 2002,
2006b; Mertah and Pahre 2005), however, are largely hampered by the con-
siderable demands put on the amount and quality of information on various
aspects of the negotiation and the ratification stages.4 Hence, it cannot surprise
that few studies have found systematic and consistent evidence in support of
implications from two-level games.
Drawing on a wealth of information coming from diverse sources, this article
offers an assessment of how referendums scheduled for the ratification of the
EU-constitution have affected the bargaining over this new treaty. We find
evidence that countries having announced a referendum before the conclusion
of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Brussels in June 2004 made
significant gains in the last phases of the negotiations, depending on the voters’
preferences.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we start by discussing the theoret-
ical background allowing us to derive hypotheses on the effect of ratification
constraints on negotiation outcomes. Given that we derive these hypotheses
from spatial models, their empirical tests also require a spatial representation
of the various actors’ positions. Thus, in section three we discuss the way in
which we derive a common bargaining space in which the positions of the
relevant ratifying actors may be mapped. This spatial representation, based
on data collected in the DOSEI-project (“Domestic structures and European
Integration”),5 allows us to derive information on negotiation gains, ratifica-
tion constraints etc. In section four we discuss the institutions under which the
ratifications in the various member countries occurred, as well as the timing
of the decision to launch a referendum. The former is crucial information
to assess whether the governments were constrained by the requirements of
the parliamentary ratification process. The latter is necessary to determine the
effect of referendums on the possible gains realized by negotiators. Based on
this information we propose in section five empirical tests of our theoretically
derived implications on the effects of referendums on negotiation gains. In
section six we conclude.
2 Theoretical Models on the Effect of Ratification Processes
and Referendums
At least since Schelling’s (1960) influential work scholars try to understand
how ratification constraints may affect the power of negotiators.6 Putnam’s
(1988) article provided a first attempt to formalize negotiations followed by
domestic ratification processes to understand their possible effects. This article
4Hug and König (2002) discuss these requirements in detail, as does Pahre (2005) from another
perspective.
5see http://dosei.dhv-speyer.de.
6What follows relies heavily on Hug (2004).
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spawned a series of studies attempting to understand various aspects of these
two-level games (e.g., Iida 1993; Schneider and Cederman 1994; Mo 1994;
Milner and Rosendorff 1996; Tarar 2001, 2005; Dai 2002; Butler 2004). While
many of these articles came to rather strong predictions concerning the effect
of ratification constraints, the systematic evaluation of all possible preference
profiles by Hammond and Prins (2006) alerted scholars to the contingency of
many of these results.7
In addition, these formal models are limited in ways that make them difficult
to apply to many recent international negotiations. On the one hand, almost all
models focus on bilateral negotiations, which are hardly characteristic of most
negotiations taking place in the EU context, for instance. On the other hand,
most formal models systematically restrict their bargaining space to a one-
dimensional line.8 While this one dimension may represent the contract curve
derived from a multi-dimensional bargaining space in a bilateral negotiation,
this shortcut is no longer available in multilateral negotiations.
Recent advances in theoretical models on multilateral bargaining allow,
however, to derive implications for the effect of ratification constraints under
empirically more realistic assumptions.9 Almost systematically, the “multiplic-
ity of subgame perfect equilibria” (Muthoo 1999, 337) in these bargaining
models with more than two players is either circumvented with a restriction of
the bargaining protocol (e.g., Chae and Yang 1988, 1994; Baliga and Serrano
1995; Krishna and Serrano 1996) or the assumption of stationary strategies
(e.g., Merlo and Wilson 1995; Winter 1996; Banks and Duggan 2000).
While the multiplicity of equilibria in multilateral bargaining situations
is a first complication, an additional one becomes especially relevant for
international negotiations whose outcomes require ratification, namely the
nature of the bargaining good. While in bilateral negotiations, the contract
curve may either reflect an underlying private good, like a dollar, or a public
good, this simple equivalence does no longer hold in multilateral negotiations.
Hence, the distribution of the bargaining gains domestically has to be assessed
explicitly in the case of negotiations over a private good.10
7Hug and König (2002) illustrate these contingent effects in their study on the negotiations on the
Amsterdam treaty.
8The only exception to this we are familiar with is Gilligan’s (2004) model, which focuses on
multilateral negotiations in a multidimensional space. The model deals, however, not with the
ratification constraints directly, but focuses on the issues of compliance at the domestic level.
Hammond and Prins (2006) also consider a two-dimensional model, but are unable to derive
general results, while Mansfield et al.’s (2000) model focuses on bilateral bargaining in a two-
dimensional space, but, as Dai (2002) rightly criticizes, restricts the set of possible bargaining
outcomes.
9Still at the end of the 1990s the author of a leading textbook on bargaining models argued that “...
the literature on multilateral and coalitional bargaining that uses... game-theoretic methodology...
is extremely small (albeit growing) and under-developed” (Muthoo 1999, 336).
10Tarar (2005) rightly argues that even in bilateral negotiations the nature of the bargaining good
and how spoils will be distributed domestically are of central importance.
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Based on Tarar’s (2001) model for bilateral negotiations, Hug (2004) pro-
poses an extension covering negotiations over a private good among three
negotiators. While some of Tarar’s (2001) results carry over to this multilateral
bargaining situation, others do not. More precisely, in trilateral negotiations
ratification constraints are profitable for all participant negotiators as long
as the former are not mutually incompatible. In addition, however, it is the
initiator of the negotiations who is likely to reap the largest gains.11
Negotiations over a public good are more easily formalized in Banks and
Duggan’s (2000) general bargaining model.12 Hug (2004) links Banks and
Duggan’s (2000) model for negotiations on public goods under a unanimous
decision rule with possible ratification constraints. This attempt illustrates and
underlines that under these modeling assumptions no general conclusions are
possible, except that the initiator of the bargaining process may reap any
remaining spoils. Whether particular ratification constraints will strengthen
the bargaining positions of particular negotiators depends on the relative
location of the reversion (or status quo) point and the positions of the various
negotiators and domestic ratification agents.
Nevertheless, as general insight may serve the result that domestic con-
straints may strengthen the bargaining position of particular countries de-
pending on the preference configuration. In addition, the advantage of the
initiator of the bargaining process, first derived by Rubinstein (1982), seems
also to be a rather robust result. The question arises, however, whether
referendums as a last stage of a ratification process have specific additional
effects. The important distinction here is between normal ratification proce-
dures for international treaties and procedures that change over the course of a
negotiation.13 If normal ratification procedures allow or require a referendum,
for instance in France or Denmark,14 then this institutional element combined
with the preferences of the voting population forms an additional ratification
constraint.15 More complicated is the situation when constitutions allow for
referendums on unspecified topics or if countries announce referendums
without relying on specific constitutional foundations. In that case, the effect
of these additional ratification hurdles is likely to be determined by the timing
of launching a referendum. If a referendum is triggered before the end of the
negotiations, we may presume that an additional ratification hurdle is erected.
If the referendum is triggered after the end of the negotiations, like for instance
the French referendum on the EU-constitution, we would expect few if any
effects on the bargaining outcome.
11These results are based on a model of negotiations over a private good, where the gains
are shared with the whole population. In Tarar’s (2001) conception this would correspond to a
presidential system, where the president has the goal to get reelected.
12Gilligan (2004) also builds on this very general model.
13Milner (1997) discusses ratification constraints that vary over time.
14We discuss these institutional provisions in more detail below.
15Hug (1997) (see critique by Feld 1997), as well as Feld et al. (2002), Hug (2002), and Feld and
Kirchgässner (2004) discuss formal models dealing specifically with referendums on international
treaties, mostly in the context of European integration.
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Thus our current theoretical knowledge would suggest the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Countries with an electorate preferring the status quo and a
referendum announced before the end of the IGC realize more negotiation
gains, independent of the other domestic ratification constraints.
Hypothesis 2 Independent of the domestic ratification constraints, the initiator
of the negotiations reaps more gains than the other negotiators.
3 Deriving the Bargaining and Ratification Space
To test our hypotheses, we need information on the bargaining positions of
three different sets of actors as well as relative positions for the three policy
positions corresponding to the status quo, the draft constitution and the final
IGC outcome. First, we obviously need information on the positions that the
national governments hold on the issues raised by the constitution project.
In addition, we also must be able to evaluate these positions relative to the
final constitutional treaty, the draft constitution presented by the Laeken
Convention as well as the status quo (i.e. the (Nice-)consolidated versions
of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the
European Community (TEC)). Second, relative to these positions we must
be able to establish the positions of the respective electorates, since our main
interest is in assessing the influence of the referendum constraint. Third, we
also have to take into account the preference constellation in the national
parliaments. This is only possible if we are able to gain information about
the positions of national parties holding seats in the parliaments. The parlia-
mentary ratification stage is a crucial control variable within our model that
cannot be dismissed. Given that no single data-source covers all three sets
of policy positions, we must link the political positions derived from three
different sources.
We derive the positions of the governments from an expert survey carried
out in the DOSEI-project,16 whereas for the positions of the median voters
we rely on mass survey data, namely the Eurobarometer-data.17 In addition,
16This survey elicited from experts the government positions on the contentious issues in the
bargaining process. The list of questions used in this article is listed in Table 12 in the appendix,
while the contributions in König and Hug (2006) discuss the results by country.
17Our analysis is based on the EB 60.1 for the old member states and on the CCEB 2003.4 for the
new member states. The Eurobarometer-data is aggregated on the national level, by determining
the median response category for each national electorate. These median positions were unique
for all countries, except Italy, where for one question the same number of respondents chose one
of the two answer categories. We have employed both of these median values in the subsequent
analyses, but we will report only the results of one of these analyses here. The result of the second
analysis yields similar results.
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we employ party manifestos for the 2004 European Parliament Election to
determine the positions of the political parties in the national parliaments.18
As a control, we also estimate the parties’ position on the EU-constitution by
aggregating the responses of their voters to the question whether they are in
favor of a constitution or not.19
Having the basic ingredients for our empirical tests, the next question relates
to how we test our hypotheses. More precisely, we have to determine what the
relevant bargaining and ratification spaces are. There are basically two main
strategies how to proceed at this stage. First, we could assume that the dimen-
sionality of the bargaining space corresponds to the set of main issues debated
during the negotiations.20 The drawbacks of this approach are that we have to
assume that the various issues are dealt with independently of each other,21
and given the data restriction, we would need to make strong assumptions
concerning the ratification space. The advantage, on the other hand, is that we
can more easily control for the overall preference configuration. Second, we
could assume that the relevant bargaining and ratification spaces are similar
(if not identical), and thus carry out our analysis in one common space. The
disadvantage of this approach is that it is much more difficult to control in
our analysis for the general preference configuration. On the other hand, we
explicitly allow for (and actually assume) issues to be dependent on each other.
The solution we choose attempts to combine both approaches. We first
follow a twofold strategy to combine these datasets: In a first step we matched
the information contained in the two surveys into a common space before in a
second step, the party manifestos may be used to determine the party positions
relative to the constitutional projects and the status quo. The combination of
the two survey-datasets must rely on a dimensional analysis of the data,22 since
we do not have exactly the same information for the governments’ and voters’
positions.
18The party manifestos of the old member states have been made available to us by Manfred G.
Schmidt, to whom we wish to express our gratitude. The manifestos of the remaining countries
have been collected in a joint effort of the scholars engaged in the DOSEI-project.
19Unfortunately, the resulting indicator has no variance whatsoever, suggesting that the Constitu-
tion would be ratified by the parliaments of all member countries according to the specified rules.
Only if we consider the relevant criterion for Denmark the 5/6 majority, do we find one parliament
where the expected outcome would be negative.
20The presumption here would be that our expert survey has covered all the relevant issues.
21Obviously there are (imperfect) ways to address the dependence of these various issues.
22In both datasets the variables are ordinal and therefore a factor analysis based on a linear
relationship is inappropriate. We therefore employed a factor analysis for ordinal variables
developed by Martin and Quinn (2004) which is discussed by Quinn (2004) in more detail. This
factor analysis relies on Bayesian statistics and the mean of the posterior distribution can be
interpreted as the maximum-likelihood estimate under the assumption of uninformative priors
(Jackman 2004). Hix and Crombez (2005) propose different ways in which policy spaces might be
derived for the data stemming from the expert survey, while our approach is discussed in more
detail in Hug and Schulz (2005).
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Fig. 1 Matched spaces of the DOSEI- and EB60.1/CCEB2003.4-data, full set of EB questions
The matching of the two two-dimensional policy spaces we obtain from
the factor analysis23 is straightforward if the three outcomes (the status quo,
the draft constitution and the IGC result) are included in each dataset by
assigning the survey answer categories for each issue of the dataset.24 Because
this results in three observations that the two datasets now have in common,
we can use the positions of these three common points as anchors to map the
positions of the voters into the policy space of the governments. The rotation
and stretching of the space of the electorates are done by regressing the two
coordinates of each anchor in the voters’ space on each dimension of the
anchors in the governments’ space.25 Figure 1 depicts the resulting bargaining
space. As the information provided in the appendix shows, the first dimension
is mostly related to policy issues in the areas of taxation, cohesion policies, but
23Ideally, we would have determined the dimensionality of the bargaining space on the basis of
an information criterion covering the whole analysis. Unfortunately, the factor analysis of ordinal
variables we employ (Quinn 2004) fails to yield the relevant information to calculate, for instance,
a Bayes factor. Instead of this we assessed the “fit” of various bargaining spaces with different
dimensionalities by assessing how well the corresponding factor scores predicted the responses
on the various issues. Especially for the expert survey data we found that the average value of
the Akaike information criterion drops considerably from a one-dimensional space to a two-
dimensional space. Increasing the dimensionality from two to three or four, however, fails to
change this average value. The results of these additional analyses will be made available on our
website.
24In Table 13 in the appendix this coding is listed for the Eurobarometer-data.
25The technical details on this simple procedure are discussed in more detail by Hug and Schulz
(2005). The validity of this matching procedure is highly dependent on the similarity of the
structure of the data in the two datasets. Clearly, the relative positions of the three policy outcomes
across the data sources should be very similar as should the dimensions that have been established.
Hug and Schulz (2005) compare the factor loadings of the two dimensional analyses in detail, so
that we only list the relevant questions from the two sources in the appendix (Tables 12 and 13).
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also institutional questions. The second dimension, on the other hand, relates
mostly to the role of the European parliament.
Once we have a common space for voters and national governments, we
need to determine the relative position of the parliamentary actors, namely
the political parties.26 In previous analyses (e.g., Hug and König 2002;
König and Luetgert 2003; Schulz 2003), this information has been extracted
from mass surveys, since there used to be questions on the party affiliation
in earlier Eurobarometer-surveys. Unfortunately, party affiliation is no longer
systematically available,27 forcing us to rely on other sources. One easily
available source for information on party positions are party manifestos. Since
most parties in the European member states (including the new members)
published manifestos related to the European Parliament (EP) Elections of
2004,28 analyzing such texts should generate relatively valid estimates of a
party’s position toward the content of the constitutional treaty. Given that a
hand-coding of these texts is resource intensive, we rely on a computer-assisted
coding using the Wordscores methodology proposed by Laver et al. (2003).29
The Wordscores methodology relies on a-priori reference scores that must
be assigned to a-priori chosen reference texts against which the remaining texts
(virgin texts) will be compared and scored. It is well suited for our purpose,
i.e. to integrate the party positions into the two-dimensional bargaining space.
To this end, we first have to choose the positions of the status quo, the IGC
and the Draft Constitution on both dimensions as reference scores. What re-
mains to be found are reference texts that define these three points extensively.
We have chosen to rely on the original treaties but we used only those parts of
these texts that correspond to the issues that appear in our expert survey.30 The
results of this scoring-strategy are listed in Table 14 in the appendix. All in all,
26Here we assume that the political parties are very disciplined and thus can be considered as
unitary actors.
27The EB 60.1 does not include information on party affiliation while the CCEB 2003.4 does. The
most recent Eurobarometer for the old member states (EB 61) does provide such information for
the European Parliament election and so does the corresponding dataset for the new members
(CCEB 2004.1). Important items, however, for example the questions on competence delegation
for 25 policy fields, are missing in this questionnaire. Since this has, as we show in Hug and Schulz
(2007), severe consequences for the dimensional analysis, we refrain from using the more recent
Eurobarometer-dataset. We also assess on the basis of a question concerning a likely vote on the
EU constitution to assess whether particular parties were in favor or not. Using this information to
determine the likelihood of ratification in parliament suggested, however, that in all parliaments
the required majorities would have been achieved.
28We employ the party manifestos for the EP elections instead of those for national elections
for several reasons. First, most manifestos for the EP elections, contrary to those for national
elections, contained statements on the constitutional treaty or at least on the way in which the
EU should develop. Second, using manifestos for national elections would have created a problem
of timing, since the national elections occur at different times. This would have resulted in the
texts referring to proposals made at very different points in time. Finally, contrary to König and
Finke (2007) (in this issue), we also refrained from using data from expert surveys, since the link
to positions on the constitutional treaty is tenuous at best.
29Benoit et al. (2005) apply the same methodology in their analysis of contributions to the
European convention.
30This set of reference texts is available on request from the authors.
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Table 1 Ratification of international treaties
Parliamentary chambers
1 2+
Simple majority MT, UK BE, IT, NL, IE
Qualified majority AT(2/3), CY(2/3), DK(5/6), EE(3/5),
EL(3/5), FI(2/3), HU(2/3), LT(2/3),
LU(2/3), LV(2/3), PT(2/3), SE(5/6),
SI(2/3), SK(3/5)
CZ(3/5), DE(2/3), ES(3/5),
FR(3/5), PL(2/3)
+ referendum DK FR, (IE)
Source: Hug and Schulz (2005), Hug and König (2006b) and http://www.unizar.es/
euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat.htm
Legend: FR and IE appear twice, since there are alternative ratification processes, of which, in the
case of Ireland, one only applies to treaties related to the EU (hence the parentheses)
the results are quite plausible: not only are most parties positioned relative
to the three versions of the treaties as well as relative to the other parties
in an expected manner,31 but in many cases the government parties are also
located quite close to the national position identified by the expert survey,
although this position did not enter the wordscoring as a reference score. Of
course, since the draft constitution, the IGC outcome and the status quo do not
differ much on the second dimension (see Fig. 1), there is not much variation
between the party positions on this dimension. The national positions, on
the other hand, do vary on the second dimension quite considerably. The
variance is much greater on the first dimension, however, and thus reduces
the importance of the second dimension for the following analysis.
4 Institutional Ratification Provisions
With respect to the constitutional treaty the ratification constraints the 25
governments of the EU face in their countries vary to a large extent. These
constraints are rather complex and have not been known with great certainty
at every stage of the bargaining process for every country. While in some coun-
tries (for example Ireland) the rules had been clear and well known from the
outset, other countries have not yet managed to decide definitely at the time
of writing whether a referendum should be held on the topic (as it is the case
in the Czech Republic). As far as the majority rule in parliament is concerned,
most countries know a stronger and a weaker requirement for international
treaties depending on whether the treaty affects the national constitution
or not. While in some countries it obviously was not too difficult to decide
that the national constitution was not affected by the constitutional treaty,
31There are some exceptions, of course, for example the “Uniti nell’ Ulivo” in Italy, the “ÖVP” in
Austria or the communist party in France. Most of these cases can be explained, however, by the
quality of the texts available.
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Table 2 Ratification of treaty on EU constitution
Parliamentary chambers
1 2+
Simple majority EL, LV, MA, SE BE, IT
Qualified majority CY(2/3), FI(2/3), HU(2/3), LT(2/3),
SK(3/5), SI(2/3),
AT(2/3), DE(2/3), FR(3/5)
+ referendum DK, LU, PT, UK CZ(3/5), ES(3/5), IE, NL, PL(2/3)
in other countries, this decision was explicitly made by parliament (Austria)
or the constitutional court (Spain). Thus, Table 1 summarizes the ratification
processes under the assumption that the ratification of an international treaty
requires constitutional changes.
For the ratification of the EU-constitution the ratification constraints differ,
however, considerably. Obviously it is difficult to assess precisely what the
negotiators anticipated regarding the various ratification procedures to be
used in the 25 domestic arenas. In Table 2 we report, however, the majority
requirements in parliament as we think they might have been expected during
the final IGC. We expect that at that time a discussion about the effect of
the treaty on the national constitution should have been started. In some
countries, however, namely Luxembourg, Greece, Sweden and Lithuania, no
indication of such a public discussion could be found. Hence, we conclude
that it was not expected that the more stringent ratification rule will apply in
these countries. A special case is Spain, where the constitutional court had to
decide on the applicability of the higher ratification provisions, which it did not
before December 2004. Therefore, we will assume the higher parliamentary
ratification hurdle for this country.
As far as the referendums are concerned, the situation is not less com-
plicated. In many countries referendums on international treaties could be
triggered by the elite under certain circumstances. Table 3 shows at what
point in time referendums were called. As the table shows, all referendums,
except one, namely the French one, were called between the end of the Laeken
convention and the end of the IGC. Given our discussion above, we will only
Table 3 Timing of
referendum announcement Country Time of announcement
Ireland No announcement, since required
Spain June 1, 2003 (Aznar)
June 24, 2004 (Zapatero)
Luxembourg June 27, 2003
Denmark August 8, 2003
Netherlands September 10, 2003
Portugal October 7, 2003
Czech Republic October 7, 2003
Poland March 24, 2004
United Kingdom April 20, 2004
Belgium June 1, 2004, but then withdrawn
France July 7, 2004
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Table 4 Referendums on the EU constitution
Referendum or not Countries
No referendum Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY),
Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), Germany (DE),
Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Italy (IT), Latvia
(LV) Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Slovakia (SK),
Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE)
Referendum, not binding, but announced
after IGC
Referendum, not binding and announced
before IGC
Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), United
Kingdom (UK)
Referendum, binding but announced
after IGC
France (FR),
Referendum, binding, required and/or
announced before IGC
Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Ireland
(IE), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES)a
aIt was not before late December 2004 that the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that the
constitutional treaty did not affect the Spanish constitution and that as a consequence a binding
referendum would not be necessary (compare http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/
Treaty_Const_Rat_spain.htm)
consider this set of countries as having possibly profited from the scheduling of
a referendum during negotiations.32 Table 4 differentiates the countries that
had announced referendums during and shortly after the bargaining process
from those with no referendum. In addition Table 4 also indicates whether the
outcome of the referendum is binding. Spain is a special case, because a binding
referendum was probably expected before the Constitutional Court ruled
that out.
5 Testing the Effects of Referendums
Testing our theoretically derived hypotheses requires apart precise informa-
tion on the preferences of various actors as discussed above, also a measure
of gains realized during the negotiations.33 In their study on the Amsterdam
negotiations Hug and König (2002) used the number of issues dropped from
the final draft which would have made a country worse of as measure for the
gains realized. König and Daimer (2005) on the other hand use as measure
for the negotiation gains the number of issues settled according to a country’s
preferences.
32Additional analyses reported in Hug (2007) (forthcoming) support this theoretically informed
decision. If France is added to this set of countries most of the effects of this additional ratification
hurdle are reduced.
33It is quite obvious that we need to subscribe here to the assumption of interpersonal compar-
isons of utilities, since hypotheses derived from two-level games suggest differential effects on
negotiation gains. While being aware of the problem of such comparisons, we alert the reader
that all studies, whether quantitative or qualitative, engage either implicitly or explicitly in such
comparisons.
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Given our interest in the final stages of the negotiations and our explicit
spatial representation we will rely on two different measures. First, we will
look only at those issues covered by our expert survey for which the draft
adopted at the June 2004 Brussels IGC differed from the Convention draft.34
This limited set allows us to measure the negotiation gains that were realized
between the end of the Laeken Convention and the final IGC meeting, i.e.,
the period during which all referendums were announced, with the exception
of the French one as discussed above. In addition, given that the set of
issues is quite limited we can also assess whether gains were realized in issue
areas that were considered as vital for particular governments.35 Second, we
will also measure in our spatial representation discussed above (see Fig. 1)
whether governments were able to move the negotiation outcome toward their
preferred position, both over the full Constitution building process (distance
to status quo compared to distance to IGC outcome) and the final negotiation
phase (distance to draft compared to distance to IGC outcome).
In a first stage we analyze whether governments that had announced ref-
erendums before the end of the IGC negotiations fared any better than the
remaining countries in the last stage of the negotiations. If we consider all
issues that were changed in this last stage, we find that on average countries
having announced a referendum gained 1.11 points,36 while the average is
only 0.94 for the other countries. If we consider the gains the negotiators
realized only for issues that our experts considered as vital for the government
under consideration, we find a different picture. Countries having announced
referendums before June 2004 actually incurred a loss of −0.22 for their vital
issues, while the remaining countries faced a loss of only −0.09.
This simple analysis only partly confirms the hypothesized effect of referen-
dums on the negotiations on the EU-constitution, however, the tests so far
neglected the contingent effect of referendums. More precisely, theoretical
models suggest that the effect should depend on the voters’ preferences as
stated in Hypothesis 1. Thus, in what follows we will provide a more precise
test of this hypothesis by looking at the effect of voter preferences contingent
on the presence of a scheduled referendum or not. The results are depicted in
Figs. 2 and 3. In both figures we depict on the horizontal axis the difference
between two distances, namely the one between the voters’ ideal point and
the status quo, and the distance between the voters’ ideal point and the IGC
outcome. Since we subtract the former from the latter, positive values indicate
that voters are closer to the draft treaty than the status quo, while negative
values indicate the reverse. Consequently, negative values suggest that voters
34We thank George Tsebelis for suggesting this additional analysis.
35At the end of the expert survey, the experts were asked to identify the issues which they
considered to be of vital importance for their national governments. Hug and König (2006a)
provide a comparative analysis of these vital issues.
36One point corresponds to one answer category closer to a national position in the expert survey.
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Fig. 2 Gains during the IGC: all issues. Regression for countries with referendums: gains =
0.20(0.58) − 21.12(8.96) * voters’ preferences (standard errors in parentheses); regression for
countries without referendums: gains =0.81(0.68) − 4.92(11.28) * voters’ preferences (standard
errors in parentheses)
in a particular country prefer the status quo to the proposed constitutional
treaty. On the vertical axis we depict the gains in the measure discussed above.
Figure 2 reports the results when considering all issues having been changed
in the draft treaty before the adoption at the IGC in June 2004. Each ×
corresponds to a country that has called a referendum on the EU-constitution
before the end of the IGC, while the +s correspond to the remaining countries.
The two lines summarize the relationship between the preferences of the
voters and the gains realized in the last phase of the negotiation. For the
countries having called a referendum, we find as expected a strong negative
relationship. This suggests that countries with a skeptical electorate and a
referendum announced before the end of the IGC fare better in the last
stages of the negotiations and realized more gains than the other countries.
If countries having triggered referendums before the end of the IGC have a
rather supportive electorate for the EU-constitution, we find that they actually
gained less than the remaining countries. The second line for the countries
having refrained from calling a referendum suggests that the preferences of
the voters did not affect systematically the gains realized in the last phase of
the negotiations.
While Fig. 2 provides considerable support for Hypothesis 1, we might
suspect that the gains realized by countries should be more strongly visible
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Fig. 3 Gains during the two stages of negotiation: vital issues. Regression for countries with
referendums: gains= −0.55(0.31) − 7.68(4.79) * voters’ preferences (standard errors in paren-
theses); regression for countries without referendums: gains= −0.34(0.27) − 9.46(4.43) * voters’
preferences (standard errors in parentheses)
in areas their respective governments considered important.37 Thus, in Fig. 3
we report the results of the same analysis as in Fig. 2 but only count the gains
a particular country realized on issues considered to be vital to its national
government.38 While we find again a negative relationship for referendum
countries, the negative effect also appears for those countries that have not
triggered a referendum. This suggests that when it comes to vital issues, having
a skeptical electorate at home was sufficient to threaten at the negotiation
table.
The same analysis is also possible for the other measure of the gains realized.
We present the results of these parallel analyses in Figs. 4 and 5. In the first
of these figures (Fig. 4) we use the overall gains realized over all issues by
comparing the preferences over the current status quo and the IGC outcome.
As in the previous figures we find a negative relationship for the set of member
countries having announced a referendum before the end of the IGC. Thus,
again, overall member countries with such referendum announcements fared
better, provided their electorate were critical toward the EU-constitution.
For the countries without referendum announcement we also find a negative
relationship, but it is much weaker.
37We thank Michael Marsh for the suggestion to control for the salience of issues.
38These obviously differ from one member state to the next.
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Fig. 4 Overall gains: SQ - IGC outcome. Regression for countries with referendums: gains = 0.04
(0.02) -0.21 (0.24) * voters’ preferences (standard errors in parentheses); regression for countries
without referendums: gains= 0.06(0.01) − 0.04(0.14) * voters’ preferences (standard errors in
parentheses)
Since all referendums were announced between the end of the Laeken
Convention and the end of the IGC, we would expect that the relationship
would even be stronger for the indicator measuring gains in this last phase.
Figure 5 shows, however, a different picture. Both for the countries having
announced a referendum and those that refrained from doing so, we find a
positive relationship between voter preferences and gains.
These results may be influenced, however, by the fact that referendums are
not the only ratification constraint. Based on our information on the location
of various actors in a bargaining space, we can also determine whether par-
liaments are likely to encounter problems in the ratification process. Table 5
summarizes this information unfortunately only for 23 out of the 25 countries.
Given that our method to derive the policy positions of parties on the basis
of their party manifestos and the treaties in their domestic language, we faced
two problems. First, Malta apparently has not yet a completely translated set
of currently used treaties. Hence, we were unable to determine the positions of
the Maltese parties. Second, the party manifestos of Cyprus were not available
electronically, forcing us to drop also this country from the analyses. In the
analyses that follow, we will only retain from this table whether ratification
was likely (1) or not (0). We use this variable together with the information
already presented to test our hypotheses.
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Fig. 5 Overall gains: Convention draft - IGC outcome. Regression for countries with referendums:
gains= 0.01(0.00) + 0.03(0.03) * voters’ preferences (standard errors in parentheses); regression
for countries without referendums: gains= 0.01(0.00) + 0.02(0.04) * voters’ preferences (standard
errors in parentheses)
In Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 we report the results of simple regression analyses
attempting to explain the various measures for the gains.39 As independent
variables we use the scheduling of a referendum before the end of the IGC, this
variable interacted with an indicator whether parliamentary ratification was
likely not to cause any problems, the voters’ preferences interacted first with
the referendum variable then also with the parliamentary ratification indicator,
and finally the parliamentary ratification indicator and two dichotomous vari-
ables for the two countries having held the presidency during the final stages
of the IGC, namely Ireland and Italy.
In Table 6 our dependent variable is the number of points by which the
issues changed during the IGC were altered in the direction of a national
positions. The first two models reflect the results presented graphically in
Fig. 2. As discussed above, the simple fact of scheduling a referendum before
the end of the IGC increased the gains during this last phase of the negotiations
(model 1). The results of model 2 suggest again that these gains are largely
39For all the regressions based on a sample of 23 or 25 observations we calculated also, based on a
suggestion by one reviewer, bootstrapped standard errors. Systematically, the differences were at
most 10% of the OLS-estimates, hence affecting in no case our substantive conclusions. For this
reason, we refrain from reporting these results here.
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Table 6 Explaining gains in changed issues during IGC
Model 1b 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b 7b
variables (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Referendum 0.174 −0.608 −0.518 0.121 −0.405 −0.405 −0.425
(0.894) (1.124) (1.112) (1.391) (1.503) (1.546) (1.592)
Referendum −1.386 −0.204 −0.056 −0.184
× parl. pro EU-const. (1.775) (2.177) (2.282) (2.371)
Referendum −16.203 −13.463 −14.700 −27.921 −27.921 −28.770
× voters’ preferences (17.773) (17.542) (17.807) (22.699) (23.355) (24.133)
Voters’ preferences −4.917 −6.552 −5.985 −5.985 −5.985 −5.136
(9.832) (10.471) (10.611) (10.645) (10.953) (11.474)
Referendum
× voters’ preferences 27.094 25.783 25.783
× parl. pro EU-const. (28.699) (29.785) (30.657)
Parl. pro EU-const. 1.385 1.931 1.931 1.931 2.059
(0.858) (1.115) (1.119) (1.151) (1.228)
IE −0.837 −0.837
(2.488) (2.561)
IT −0.946
(2.373)
Constant 0.938 0.809 0.150 −0.145 −0.145 −0.145 −0.124
(0.536) (0.592) (0.782) (0.876) (0.879) (0.905) (0.933)
rmse 2.145 2.132 2.030 2.053 2.059 2.119 2.181
n 25 25 23 23 23 23 23
dependent on having a skeptical electorate. In the absence thereof scheduling
a referendum may be even counterproductive. This strong contingent effect
of the voters’ preferences remains even when we control for the fact whether
the parliament was expected to ratify the EU-constitution according to the
respective domestic requirements (model 3). This later dichotomous variable
should, however, again modify the effects of the other two variables. This
is accounted for in models 4 and 5. Interestingly enough these additional
interaction effects change in part the overall picture. While the effect of the
voters’ preferences is still as expected negative, this effect is almost completely
reduced in countries where the parliament was in favor of the EU-constitution.
Finally, hypothesis 2 would suggest that the two countries having held the
EU-presidency during the final phases of the IGC would obtain additional
gains. The results reported in the last column hardly support this implication.
Both for Ireland which presided over the final negotiations and Italy having
led the EU at the beginning of the IGC we find negative coefficients.
While the results discussed so far provided some support for the hypothe-
sized effect of voter preferences and an announced referendum, we did not
control so far for the effect of the overall preference configuration. To do
so, we analyze exactly the same set of issues, namely those changed during
the IGC, but estimate the effect of voter preferences and institutions for each
of the issues separately and controlling for the number of countries which won
due to the proposed change. Hence, instead of having 25 observations we have
six times as many, namely the number of issues changed at the IGC times
the number of member countries. Our dependent variable is the gain realized
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during the IGC, while the independent variables remain the same with one
exception. For each issue we calculated the number of member states winning
from the changes adopted in the IGC. Given that the dependent variable only
takes on four different values and because of the clear lack of independence
between observations, we estimated our model as an ordered probit model and
calculated clustered standard errors per member state.40
The results reported in Table 7 first confirm the insights of the previous
analyses. Model 2 clearly shows the less skeptical voters become, the lower
are the gains in countries having scheduled a referendum before the end
of the IGC. This statistically significant effect is reduced if we also allow
for an effect of the voters’ preferences in countries having not scheduled a
referendum. But quite clearly, the substantive difference remains. In model
4 we introduce as control variable the number of countries having gained
on the particular issue during the IGC. Not surprisingly, we find a strong
and significant effect, but more interestingly, none of the other estimated
coefficients is affected by the introduction of this new control variable. Adding
the other variables also employed in Table 6 hardly changes the general
conclusions.41 The only notable insight is the effect of voters’ preferences
is positive and statistically significant in countries where parliaments were
expected to be in favor of the constitution and a referendum was scheduled.
In the models in which this interaction appears (models 7–9 in Table 7), the
interaction effect between referendums and voter preferences also becomes
statistically significant and strongly negative. This suggests the conclusion that
the effect of voter preferences was especially strong if parliament was expected
to be against the EU constitution and a referendum was scheduled. Concerning
our second hypothesis we find stronger results that go against our expectations,
however. For Ireland we find even a significant negative effect, while the effect
is also negative for Italy but not statistically significant.
On a more abstract level the results reported in Table 7 suggest that even
though the preference configuration as measured by the number of winners
is an important predictor for gains, it fails to affect the general thrust of our
results. Hence, in the remaining analyses we refrain from controlling for this
important independent variable, since it is most likely orthogonal to all our
other independent variables (as in the analysis reported in Table 7).
Hence, we turn to another control that might prove important, namely
the saliency of the issues considered. While Fig. 2 suggested much less support
for our hypotheses when the dependent variable is the gains made in the vital
issues, the results reported in Table 6 alter this picture a bit. The first model
obviously replicates the negative result discussed above, but once we take
40This obviously only controls for the lacking independence in the error structure and not in the
possibly misspecified theoretical model (a point often forgotten by scholars employing clustered
standard errors). Ideally, we would also allow for issue specific effects, but given that the number
of winners only varies across issues, this is not possible.
41Again, given that we fail to have information on the position of the political parties in two
countries, we have a smaller set of observations in models 5–9.
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into consideration the voters’ preferences and the parliamentary ratification
constraints, most of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. We
find again that having skeptical voters allowed countries with referendums to
realize gains. When looking for an indication whether the presidency allows for
additional gains, we find again hardly conclusive results. On vital issues Ireland
on average lost out while Italy, surprisingly seemed to have gained a bit, but
these effects are statistically not significant.
Turning now to the analyses using the information from the spatial analysis,
the results become weaker. If we look at the overall gains realized during
the IGC (Table 9), we fail to find the expected effect for voters’ preferences,
even when controlling for parliamentary ratification. Also the results for this
later variable are hardly informative, as are those for the effect of the EU-
presidency. While finding a positive coefficient for Ireland and a negative one
for Italy, these are correspondingly very small, even though the later achieves
statistical significance. These rather disappointing results are likely to find an
explanation in Fig. 1, which suggests that in the spatial representation the draft
constitution and the IGC outcome are almost indistinguishable. Given this,
measures based on movements from the former to the latter are likely to be
quite noisy measures of the success in the final negotiations.
Finally, we present in Table 10 the results for the overall gains over the
whole negotiation phase comprising also the Laeken convention. Here the
pattern of estimated coefficients is much more in line with our theoretical
implications. Again, we find the anticipated effects of voter preferences in
countries having scheduled referendums, some of which even almost achieve
statistical significance. The effect is slightly strengthened in countries having
supportive parliaments, but this effect is minute.
6 Conclusion
Compared to any previous treaty modifications in the EU, the “Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe” involved to a much larger extent
actors beyond the iron-circle of governmental and supranational representa-
tives. Already during the drafting phase societal interest were actively sought
to be associated, as they were in many member countries in the preference
formation stage (Hug and König 2006a). Hence, it can only partly surprise that
many governments of member states decided to consult their citizens in the
ratification stage. As discussed in this article almost all these referendums were
either constitutionally required or announced before the IGC negotiations
concluded in Brussels in June 2004. Most theoretical work on ratification
processes would suggest that these referendums erected additional ratification
hurdles and thus may have benefited member states during the negotiations.
In this article, we first discussed the theoretical underpinnings for this
contention, which suggested that hypotheses may be formulated on the effect
of such referendums, but that these are contingent effects. In addition, the
implications of the theoretical models also set the bar at a very high level
when it comes to the quality and wealth of information necessary to test these
implications. Thanks to the painstaking data-gathering effort undertaken in
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the DOSEI-project we were able in this article to present rather rich empirical
evidence supporting many of the implications of the theoretical models.
More precisely, we find that referendums may have led to negotiation gains,
provided, first of all, that the referendum is scheduled in a country with
skeptical voters. In the absence of Euro-skeptic voters, calling a referendum
hardly has the hoped for effect. This result appears strongest for the issues
changed during the IGC. While similar patters of gains and losses as a function
of referendums and voter preferences also appear over the whole negotiation
process, the effects are weaker. Second, the effect of referendums and voter
preferences is also affected by whether the EU-constitution was likely to cross
the bar of parliamentary ratification.
While these results give much credence to the theoretical models discussed
above, two major issues are still unresolved. First of all, given that most of the
referendums scheduled on the EU-constitution were not required, we need to
understand why these were triggered. Was it the idea that a referendum could
be used as a bargaining chip, or were there other considerations as Closa (2005)
suggests.
Second, given that already two referendums have failed on the EU-
constitution, namely in France and the Netherlands, the question arises
whether these countries will have the possibility to reap additional gains
in renegotiations. In previous “ratification accidents” the “renegotiations”
resulted in rather negligible changes if at all, but the countries concerned were
obviously not part of the founding members of the EU. Thus, even though the
present article has offered evidence in support of the theoretical implications
on referendums, there still are a series of questions that await answers in future
research.
Appendix
Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regres-
sion analyses, while Table 12 list the topics covered in the questions used in
the factor analysis reported in the main text including the factor loadings of
Table 11 Descriptive statistics
Var Min Mean Max S.D. Number
Gains draft-IGC −0.013 0.008 0.014 0.007 25
Gains status quo-draft −0.017 0.049 0.112 0.037 25
Gains in changed issues −2.000 1.000 4.000 2.102 25
Gains in changed vital issues −1.500 −0.140 2.000 0.952 25
Referendum before end of IGC 0.000 0.360 1.000 0.490 25
Parliamentary support for EU-constitution 0.000 0.522 1.000 0.511 23
Voters’ preferences for IGC outcome −0.100 −0.032 0.064 0.054 25
IE 0.000 0.040 1.000 0.200 25
IT 0.000 0.040 1.000 0.200 25
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the various questions on the first (λ2) and second (λ3) dimension. λ1 can be
compared to a measure of the “item difficulty” (Quinn 2004). In Table 13 we
list the questions used in our most extensive analysis presented in the main text
of this article. Table 14 reports the results of the wordscores analyses yielding
the positions of political parties relative to the status quo, the draft constitution
and the IGC outcome.
References
Baliga, S., & Serrano, R. (1995). Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information. Journal of
Economic Theory, 67(2), 578–589.
Banks, J. S., & Duggan, J. (2000). A bargaining model of collective choice. American Political
Science Review, 94(1 MAR), 73–88.
Barry, B. (1980a). Is it better to be powerful or lucky? Part I. Political Studies, 28(2), 183–194.
Barry, B. (1980b). Is it better to be powerful or lucky? Part II. Political Studies, 28(3), 338–352.
Benoit, K., Laver, M., Arnold, C., Pennings, P., & Hosli, M. O. (2005). Measuring national
delegate positions at the convention on the future of europe using computerized wordscoring.
European Union Politics, 6(3), 291–313.
Butler, C. K. (2004). Modeling compromise at the international table. Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 21(3), 159–177.
Chae, S., & Yang, J.-A. (1988). The unique perfect equilibrium of an N-person bargaining game.
Economic Letters, 28, 221–223.
Chae, S., & Yang, J.-A. (1994). A N-person pure bargaining game. Journal of Economic Theory,
62, 86–102.
Closa, M. C. (2005). Why convening referendums? Explaining decisions in EU consti-
tutional politics. Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops,
Granada.
Dai, X. (2002). Political regimes and international trade: The democratic difference revisited.
American Political Science Review, 96(1), 159–166.
Evans, P. B., Jacobson, H. K., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds). (1993). Double-edged diplomacy: Interna-
tional bargaining and domestic politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Feld, L. P. (1997). Referenda (“Voice”) and tiebout competition (“Exit”) as means of integration?
Comment to Simon Hug. Aussenwirtschaft, 52(1-2), 311–318.
Feld, L. P., & Kirchgässner, G. (2004). The role of direct democracy in the European Union. In:
C. B. Blankart, & D. C. Mueller (Eds.), A constitution for the European union (pp. 203–236).
Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Feld, L. P., Kirchgässner, G., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (2002). Enlargement and the European
budget: Budgetary decision-making and fiscal constraints. In: B. Steunenberg (Ed.), Widening
the European Union: The politics of institutional change and reform (pp. 144–162). London:
Routledge.
Gilligan, M. J. (2004). Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international multilateral agreements?
International Organization, 58, 459–484.
Hammond, T. W., & Prins, B. C. (2006). Domestic Veto institutions, divided government, and
the status quo: A spatial model of two-level games with complete information. In: R. Pahre
(Ed.), Democratic foreign policy making: Problems of divided government and international
cooperation. New York: Palgrave.
Hix, S. (2005). The political system of the European Union 2nd edn. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Hix, S., & Crombez, C. (2005). Extracting ideal point estimates from actors’ preferences in the EU
constitutional negotiations. European Union Politics, 6(3), 353–376.
Hug, S. (1997). Integration through referendums? Aussenwirtschaft, 52(1-2), 287–310.
Hug, S. (2002). Voices of Europe. Citizens, referendums and European integration. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process 217
Hug, S. (2004). Models of multilateral negotiations and ratification. Prepared for delivery at the
2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2–5,
2004.
Hug, S. (2007) (forthcoming). The strategic context of referendums on the EU constitution. In:
C. H. de Vreese (Ed.), The dynamics of referendum campaigns. London: Palgrave.
Hug, S., & König, T. (2002). In view of ratification. Governmental preferences, and domestic con-
straints at the Amsterdam intergovernmental conference. International Organization, 56(2),
447–476.
Hug, S., & König, T. (2006a). Conclusion. In: T. König, & S. Hug (Eds.), Policy-making processes
and the European constitution: A comparative study of member states and accession countries
(pp. 260–278). London: Routledge.
Hug, S., & König, T. (2006b). Divided government and the ratification of the Amsterday treaty.
In: R. Pahre (Ed.), Democratic foreign policy making: Problems of divided government and
international cooperation (pp. 133–150). New York: Palgrave.
Hug, S., & Schulz, T. (2005). Using mass survey data to infer political positions. European Union
Politics, 6(3), 339–352.
Hug, S., & Schulz, T. (2007) (forthcoming). Referendums and ratification of the EU constitution.
In: W. Marxer, Z. Pállinger, B. Kaufmann, & T. Schiller (Eds.), Direct democracy in Europe -
current position and research prospects for the 21st Century. VS-Verlag.
Iida, K. (1993). When and how do domestic constraints matter? Two-level games with uncertainty.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37(3), 403–426.
Iida, K. (1996). Involuntary defection in two-level games. Public Choice, 89(2), 283–303.
Jackman, S. (2004). Bayesian analysis for political research. Annual Review of Political Science, 7,
483–505.
König, T., & Luetgert, B. (2003). The treaty of nice. Institutional reform of the European Union by
intergovernmental and domestic Veto players. Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR
General Conference, Marburg 18–21 September 2003.
König, T., & Finke, D. (2007) (in this issue). Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy
change in the European constitution-building process. Review of International Organizations,
2(2).
König, T., & Hug, S. (2000). Ratifying Maastricht. Parliamentary votes on international treaties
and theoretical solution concepts. European Union Politics, 1(1), 89–122.
König, T. & Hug, S. (Eds.) (2006). Policy-making processes and the European constitution: A
comparative study of member states and accession countries. London: Routledge.
König, T., & Daimer, S. (2005). Absolute and relative gains in European constitution-building-and
why? Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 14–19 April, Granada.
Krishna, V., & Serrano, R. (1996). Multilateral bargaining. Review of Economic Studies, 63(1),
61–80.
Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting policy positions from political texts using
words as data. American Political Science Review, 97(2), 311–331.
Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2000). Free to trade: Democracies, autocra-
cies, and international trade. American Political Science Review, 94(2 June), 305–321.
Martin, A. D., & Quinn, K. M. (2004). MCMCpack 0.4-8. (available from http://mcmcpack.
wustl.edu).
Merlo, A., & Wilson, C. (1995). A stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete
information. Econometrica, 63(2 Mar.), 371–399.
Mertah, A. and Pahre, R. (2005). Patently misleading: Partial implementation and bargaining
leverage in Sino-American negotiations on intellectual property rights. International Orga-
nization, 59(3), 695–730.
Milner, H. (1997). Interests, institutions, and information. Domestic politics and international rela-
tions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (1996). Trade negotiations, information and domestic politics:
The role of domestic groups. Economics & Politics, 8(2), 145–189.
Mo, J. (1994). The logic of two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 38(3), 402–422.
Muthoo, A. (1999). Bargaining theory with applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pahre, R. (2005). Formal theory and case-study methods in EU studies. European Union Politics,
6(1), 113–145.
218 S. Hug, T. Schulz
Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International
Organization, 42(3), 427–460.
Quinn, K. M. (2004). Bayesian factor analysis for mixed ordinal and continuous responses. Political
Analysis, 12(4), 338–353.
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50, 97–110.
Schelling, T. C. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schneider, G., & Cederman, L.-E. (1994). The change of tide in political cooperation: A
limited information model of european integration. International Organization, 48(4):
633–662.
Schulz, T. (2003). Explaining gains and losses in EU accession negotiations. Paper prepared for
presentation at the ECPR General Conference, Marburg 18–21 September 2003.
Tarar, A. (2001). International bargaining with two-sided domestic constraints. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 45(3), 320–340.
Tarar, A. (2005). Constituencies and preferences in international bargaining. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 49(3), 383–407.
Winter, E. (1996). Voting and vetoing. American Political Science Review, 90, 813–823.
